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Abstract:  This paper modifies Kak’s three-stage protocol so that it can guarantee secure 
transmission of information. Although avoiding man-in-the-middle attack is our primary 
objective in the introduction of classical authentication inside the three-stage protocol, we 
also benefit from the inherent advantages of the chosen classical authentication protocol. 
We have tried to implement ideas like key distribution center, session key, timestamp and 
nonce, within the quantum cryptography protocol. 
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Introduction 
 
The purpose of cryptography is to restrict access to a message and let it be read by only 
the desired recipient. In classical cryptography, a message is encrypted by a key and that 
key is kept secret (or made public). Decrypting the message is made hard by large 
number of possible keys and the key is distributed among interested parties who can 
decrypt and get the message. Key distribution remains a difficult issue in the first place. 
 
Quantum key distribution is a provably secure protocol, which can create a private key 
between parties interested to exchange information over public channel. This key can be 
used to create a classical private key cryptosystem. The only requirement for quantum 
key distribution is that, while transmitting over the public channel, the error-rate (R) must 
be less than a certain threshold. 
 
In this note we modify Kak’s three-stage protocol [1] so that it can guarantee secure 
transmission of information. We do this by the use of a hybrid model, which seems 
reasonable since the implementation of a quantum cryptography system will never be 
purely quantum. Although avoiding man-in-the-middle attack [2] is our primary objective 
in the introduction of classical authentication inside the three-stage protocol, we also 
benefit from the inherent advantages of the chosen classical authentication protocol.  
 
Quantum key distribution 
 
Say an eavesdropper Eve is trying to intercept the message being transmitted between 
Alice and Bob. Quantum key distribution is effective because of the no-cloning theorem 
[3]. If Eve tries to differentiate between two non-orthogonal states, it is not possible to 
achieve information gain without collapsing the state of at least one of them. 
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This is clear from considering |ψ  and |ϕ  to be the non-orthogonal quantum states Eve 
is trying to know about. If these states interact with a standard state | u , 
                                                     | | | |u vψ ψ→  
                                                     /| | | |u vϕ ϕ→  
 
Eve would want | v and /| v  to be different, to know the identity of the state. However 
inner products are preserved under unitary transformations and 
 
/| | | |v v u uψ ϕ ψ= ϕ     or, /| |v v u u 1= =  
 
So | v and /| v  must be identical and Eve will need to disturb one of the two states in 
order to acquire any information. 
 
Kak’s three-stage quantum protocol 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Three stage quantum protocol applying commutative transformations 
 
 
This protocol can be summarized as follows: 
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1. Alice applies a unitary transformation  on quantum information X and sends 
the qubits to Bob. 
AU
2. Bob applies  on the received qubits , which gives  and sends it 
back to Alice. 
BU AU ( )B AU U X
3. Alice applies †AU (transpose of the complex conjugate of ) on the received 
qubits to get  and sends it back to Bob. 
AU
† †( ) ( ) ( )A B A A B D BU U U X U U U X U X= =
4. Bob applies  on to get the information X. †BU ( )BU X
 
Here  and  must be commutative to each other, which means 
that . 
AU BU
( ) ( )B A A BU U X U U X=
 
With n number of qubits present in the message, the transformations  and  both 
must be of   dimension. It has been observed that the (2 × 2) rotation operator, Pauli-
X, Pauli-Y and Pauli-Z can be used as commutative transformations in 1-qubit system as 
all of these are 2 × 2 matrices. 
AU BU
2n
 
In order to find transformations for an n qubit system we can randomly pick any of these 
2×2 matrices and tensor multiply it [4] with another randomly picked one (may be itself) 
and keep on tensor multiplying for  n times, which will eventually produce a ×  
matrix. The commutativity of the rotation operator can be shown as below: 
2n 2n
 
                                   
                                        
cos sin
( )
sin cos
R
θ θθ θ θ
−⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  
 
cos sin cos sin cos( ) sin( )
( ). ( ) .
sin cos sin cos sin( ) cos( )
R R
θ θ φ φ θ φ θθ φ φθ θ φ φ θ φ θ φ
− − + −⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ + +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝
+ ⎞⎟⎠  
 
For a 2-qubit system: 
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cos sin 0 0
1 0 cos sin sin cos 0 0
( ) *
0 1 sin cos 0 0 cos sin
0 0 sin cos
R
θ θ
θ θ θ θθ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
−⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟−⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎜ ⎟= =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟−⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 
 
where “*” denotes tensor product. 
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Man-in-the-middle attack for three-stage protocol 
 
Man-in-the-middle attack can affect both classical and quantum channels. Here Eve can 
pretend to be Bob to Alice and vice-versa. Instead of  she selects  (which is also 
commutative) and fakes a response which looks similar to what Bob would have done. 
Eve pretends as Alice to Bob with the transformation
BU CU
DU , which is commutative to  
BU  and instead of X sends a gibberish Y. So from interaction with Alice he acquires 
value X and sends a junk Y to Bob and hence disables the protocol. 
 
 
Figure 2. Three-stage protocol under Man-in-the-middle attack 
 
Perkins proposed use of entangled pairs for a possibly secure three-stage protocol that 
can avoid man-in-the-middle attack [5]. But while distributing the entangled pairs, they 
might get corrupt during the transit. So if the entangled pairs are not matched then the 
process will be aborted and this might take place very frequently. So in order to ensure 
security from man-in-the-middle attack and avoid the uncertainty regarding entangled 
pairs this paper proposes a hybrid model that uses classical authentication protocols to 
ensure security in three-stage quantum protocol. 
 
 
 
 4
Description of the proposed protocol 
 
Here, we use modified version of the protocols proposed by Denning-Sacco [6] and 
Kehne et al [7], as the authentication protocol, alongside the qubits sent in each stage. It 
takes help from a central Key Distribution Center (KDC), which assigns the session key 
and work as the central authority for authentication. 
 
Firstly, as this protocol uses classical bit sequence, we have to transform the bit sequence 
into qubits. A bit sequence of 01101… can be transformed into 0 1 1 0 1 ... , even; to 
increase the amount of reliability we can map 0 and 1 into more than one photon. Now 
what we are doing in each step is that we are sending a series of photon as in usual three-
stage protocol and still using the authentication protocol. Each time Alice or Bob (or the 
KDC) gets the stream of photons; they convert the authentication part to classical 
information, then process it and again transform it into quantum information before 
transmitting. Say, Q (.) is the function used to denote conversion of classical bits to 
quantum qubits.  is also used to get the classical bits inside the Alice, Bob and 
KDC units and are not shown in the protocol. 
1(.)Q−
 
The protocol can be described as follows: 
 
1.          :A B→ ( || ) || (A a AQ ID N U X )
 
2.    :B KDC→ ( || || [ || || ]) || ( )
bB b K A a b B A
Q ID N E ID N T U U X
 
3.    :KDC A→ ( [ || || || ]) || [ || || ]) || ) || ( )
a bK B a s b K A s b b B A
Q E ID N K T E ID K T N U U X
 
4.           :A B→ †( [ || || ]) || [ ]) || ( )
b sK A s b K b A A B
Q E ID K T E N U U U X
 
 
1. A sends quantum information of the nonce  and the ID along side the message to B. aN
 
2. B also sends his ID and nonce and encrypts A’s ID, nonce and his timestamp using 
shared key between B and KDC. This initiates KDC to assign a session key. 
 
3. KDC assigns a session key and prepares packages for A and B which include their own 
ID, session key and B’s timestamp. A’s nonce is encrypted inside A’s package but B’s 
nonce is kept open. A gets back his nonce and A is assured of its timeliness by the 
session key and ensured that it’s not a replay. This block also verifies that B has 
received A’s earlier message with help of B’s ID. 
 
4.  Session key authenticates that the message came from A and is not a replay. 
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Figure 3: Classical authentication protocol aided three-stage quantum protocol 
 
 
Under the described circumstances, man-in-the-middle attack is no more possible, 
because we are using timestamps, IDs, session keys, nonces and encryption key for 
verification. If the authentication process detects any problem, the process can be 
aborted. In this protocol we are dependent on the KDC and we need the KDC to be trust-
worthy. 
 
Conclusions 
 
There are many inherent advantages of the proposed system. For, example, the KDC 
can’t see the message in this system. Neither Bob nor Eve is capable of modifying or 
forging the message. Alice cannot disavow sending that message and simultaneously Bob 
cannot deny receiving the message later on. The transmission is quantum and hence non-
reproducible. Synchronization throughout the network is not needed as the time-stamp is 
provided by Bob and hence will correspond to Bob’s clock only. Suppress-reply attacks 
can be avoided because the nonces the recipients will choose are unpredictable to the 
sender.  
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